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Abstract 
The institutional platforms that supported activist intellectuals seeking to 
inaugurate political and cultural modernity through the formation of study 
societies (xuehui) proliferated throughout the late Qing China (ca. 1895-
1911). While existing studies either subsume this distinctive phenomenon 
under the political programs of reform and revolutionary movements or 
conceive it as a kind of the prototypical formation of civil society and the 
public sphere in late Qing China, they seldom question the meanings and 
functions of ‘civilization,” “society” and “civility” as the constitutive and 
highly contested notions underlying the cultural and political practices of 
these study societies. This paper argues that the symbolic and practical 
aspects of this phenomenon can be better understood as a sociological 
process of state formation. By generalizing Norbert Elias’ analysis of the 
relationship between power figuration and affective self-constraint in 
Europe’s transition from an absolutist “court society” to an imperialist 
“world society,” this paper explains why and how these study societies 
arose as a civilizing movement within the context of Chinese social and 
cultural politics of the late nineteenth century. 
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The Problem: ‘Civilization’ and ‘Society’ as Language Events 
This article offers a sociological analysis of the cultural and political 
dynamics of study societies (xuehui) proliferating throughout late Qing 
China (ca. 1895-1911). Mostly founded by the reformist and later 
revolutionary elements of the intellectual elites or “literati,” the study 
societies were designed to unite and empower the elites themselves and 
by extension the common people. Therefore, the societies laid the 
societal foundation for modernizing the Chinese nation-state against the 
Western imperialist states and Meiji Japan. While the study societies 
sought primarily to promote Western learning through public lectures, 
and publication of books and newspapers, they served as an important 
institutional platform for activist intellectuals to inculcate the elites and 
the people with “civility,” the general qualities requisite of a citizen 
which were believed to constitute the civilized nations of the West. In 
this framework, the weakening imperial state and the decadent 
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traditional society of China seemed to be precariously caught between 
barbarism and civilization. Many study societies sought to enable the 
nascent Chinese nation to attain civilization and become a strong state. 
 
“Civilization” (wenmin) and “society” (qun, shehui) thus constituted 
the leitmotifs of the study society movement in the late Qing. They were 
part of the broader project of rejuvenating “Confucian religion” as the 
spiritual and institutional force of Imperial China in the reform era, but 
they were coupled with the cultivation of military citizenship among the 
Chinese people in the revolutionary period. The changing meanings and 
functions of “civilization” and “society” directly shaped the trajectory of 
cultural and political modernization in early twentieth-century China. 
The very appearance and prevalence of these neologisms constitutes 
what the French historians and sociologists call “language events,” 
which reflect and mediate long-term institutional transformations 
(Boudon 2007: 36). The major purpose of this paper is to clarify the 
sociological and cultural significance of these study societies and their 
orientations towards “civilization” and “civility”.   
 
The study society movement has been meticulously documented by 
historians and examined in relation to the concept of civil society and 
citizenship (Zhang 1971, 1975; Wang 1971; Fogel and Zarrow 1997). 
Drawing upon the theoretical insights offered by Liang Qichao and Tan 
Sitong, this historical approach highlights the overarching objective of 
late Qing study societies to strengthen the solidarity or “society” among 
the elites and to cultivate the Chinese people into virtuous modern 
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citizens (Price 1997). Closely related to this approach is the debate over 
civil society and public sphere in China. The scholars identify the 
existence of a burgeoning sphere of gentry-based associations and 
presses as symptomatic of the prototypical formation of civil society and 
public sphere in late Qing China. As the study societies belonged to the 
“third realm” between the state and the families, private interests were 
transcended by the activist gentry elites to rebuild the moral and public 
authority in local and national affairs (Huang 1993; Rowe 1993; 
Wakeman 1993).  
 
This civil society argument echoes the paradigm of “local elite 
dominance” in the Chinese historiography. Such a paradigm challenges 
the longstanding emphasis on the modernization theory and its critique 
of the subordination of gentry under the imperial bureaucracy and 
kinship system (Esherick and Rankin 1990). According to Mary Rankin, 
the peculiar sociopolitical context of late imperial China generated a 
relatively autonomous space between state and society, in which the 
local gentry together with the rising commercial elites actively engaged 
in managing public affairs and formulating public opinion. Inspired by 
the revival of the Confucian statecraft tradition, the study society 
reflected a rising trend of the local elites to position themselves as 
advocates and exemplars of modern citizenship (Rankin 1986; Brook and 
Frolic 1997). Underlying these interpretations is the common analytical 
emphasis on the associational structure of these study societies and its 
impact on facilitating civic culture against the bureaucratic ethos and 
amoral familism of the official and private spheres. The theoretical basis 
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of these historical studies resides in the associationalist paradigm in 
sociology, for which civil society comprises voluntary associations 
conducive to the forging of non-coercive, horizontal ties among their 
members, thereby cultivating the culture of civic engagement and laying 
the institutional foundation for democratic governance (Putnam 1993, 
2000; Edwards 2001). This associationalist paradigm is embraced by 
historians reveal their unanimous preference for “study association” 
over “study society.”  
 
Granted the importance of institutional structure and social capital, 
the associationalist paradigm in historical and sociological analysis 
nevertheless abstracts the specific meanings of “civility” and “society” 
from the concrete practices of study societies, which were in turn situated 
within broader sociopolitical and world-historical contexts. Specifically, 
there has been no adequate treatment of the paramount themes of 
“civilization”, “Confucian religion” and “military citizenship” in the 
study society movement, all of which were emergent responses of the 
late Qing intellectuals to the formation of modern Chinese nation-state 
under the constraints of traditional ideologies and imperialist powers. 
By adhering to a singular, undifferentiated conception of gentry elites 
and a trans-historical model of civil organizations, the question of what 
constituted the practical and constructed meanings of “civility” in the 
first place remains unanswered. Instead of probing into the linguistic 
and institutional transformations associated with the study societies, the 
latter were subsumed along with other types of elite-based associations 
such as chambers of commerce under the rubric of the local gentry’s 
Civilization and Competition 
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dominance and Confucian revival. While it is not wrong to see the study 
societies as indicative of the institutionalization of civil society and 
citizenship in China, they must be placed in a cultural and 
comparative-historical perspective in order to examine the importance 
of the study society movement.  
 
How should we conceptualize and explain the developmental 
patterns and characteristics of the late Qing study societies? The existing 
literature on state formation and civilization has largely focused on 
those cases in which the cultures of civility were emanated or promoted 
by the state. In this vein the relationship between state formation and 
civilization is articulated on the basis of empirical generalizations from 
the paradigmatic case of Western Europe. Central to this theoretical 
model is the driving force of war-making and the monopolization of 
violence (and taxation) by the modern state, which in turn unleashes the 
cultural and political processes of civilization.  
 
Such a theoretical model could be found in Norbert Elias’ (1983, 
1994[1939]) theory of civilizing process. The incessant wars in feudal 
Europe, according to Elias, had eventually led to the concentration of 
military and political powers in the hands of absolutist rulers. In the 
process the aristocratic classes were transformed from warriors to 
courtiers, whose accesses to power depended no longer upon military 
and feudal services, but rather the direct conferrals of favor and status 
by the kings under the setting of the royal courts. As the resort to 
expressed force and violence were precluded by the domination of 
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single powerful rulers, careful observance and meticulous refinement of 
court etiquettes became the ways by which the aristocratic elites and the 
absolutist kings displayed, maintained and acquired their status honor 
and power. The performance of etiquettes and rituals thus became the 
sole legitimate means of power and status competition, in which those 
courtiers who could not control aggressive emotions or affect before 
their enemies would have a precarious chance of survival and success in 
the subaltern struggles of the absolutist courts. Accordingly a culture of 
‘civility’ and ‘society’ originated from the peculiar power setting (or 
‘figuration’ in Elias’ rendering) of the courts, in which the capacities to 
exercise self-restraint, to refrain from violence, and to represent oneself 
appropriately before antagonistic others were identified and valued as 
noble virtues par excellence.  
 
Hence what contributed to the rise of the culture of ‘civility’ was the 
dynamics of competition, defined here as power struggles without 
resorting to open and violent conflict (Simmel 1955). With the 
elimination of feudal wars, the initial stage of free and relatively equal 
competition had given way to the centralization of military and political 
power by the absolutist kings. With the internal pacification of the 
jurisdictions and territories owned by the absolutist rulers, however, the 
maintenance of their power monopolies were increasingly dependent 
upon the contribution of taxes and the fulfillment of specialized 
administrative functions by the nobilities, the bourgeoisies, and 
eventually the citizens. The personal, ‘private’ monopoly of the 
absolutist ruler vis-à-vis courtiers was gradually transformed into the 
Civilization and Competition 
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impersonal and ‘public’ rule of the modern state bureaucracy vis-à-vis 
social classes.  
 
According to Max Weber, a modern state is a monopolizer of 
legitimate violence and taxation within a given territory. It not only 
possesses the administrative structure of bureaucratization and political 
centralization but also dictates the symbolic and practical templates of 
“civility,” “society” and “civilization.” The state’s monopolization of 
power renders possible internal pacification and the modernization 
processes of commercialization and urbanization. In these 
developmental processes, the ever lengthened chains of social and 
functional interdependence generate the pressure for the embedded 
individuals to exercise tighter self-constraints and disciplines. In this 
way the aristocratic culture of civility” was progressively spread to the 
nobles de robe, bourgeoisies and finally the general public.  
 
This process culminated in the extension of the meaning of civility to 
that of civilization, a transformation in pace with the intensified warfare 
among the internally pacified states. In the eighteenth century the notion 
of civilization served for the aristocratic and the intellectual elites like 
Montesquieu and Voltaire to evaluate all societies along an evolutionary 
scale of civilized versus barbaric peoples and states. With the relative 
pacification of Western Europe in the late nineteenth century, the notion 
was explicitly invoked by various nation-states to legitimize their 
imperialist invasions against the backward and stagnant peoples in the 
non-Western world. In this light, the “world society” among nations 
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could be taken as a “court society: writ large, in which the nations found 
it imperative to remain “courteous” by constraining their open rivalries 
and conflicts.  
 
 
From Christian Civilization to Confucian Religion 
The rise of study societies directly responded to the decline of the Qing 
state as a monopolizer of political and ideological powers. With the 
strengthening of its early absolutist rule, the Qing state (ca. 1644-1911) 
monopolized the allocation of spiritual (learning and cultivation) and 
material (degree and office) goods on an unprecedented scale. This led 
to the corruption of Chinese bureaucrats and literati to an extent no less 
severe and rampant than the priests in the medieval Catholic Church. 
The state’s monopolistic control was gravely challenged by the 
encompassing crises of silver outflow, peasant unrests, and most fatally, 
the Western imperialist intrusions.  
 
Following the military defeat of the Qing in the Sino-Japanese War, 
seventy-two study societies emerged between 1895 and 1898, a period 
known as the Wuxu Reform (Min 1995). The study societies continued to 
grow after a brief moment of prohibition by the state. By 1909, 723 study 
societies had been founded across China (Sang 1995: 274). Unlike the 
Foreign Affairs Movement in the mid-nineteenth century, the reformist 
intellectuals of the study society movement perceived the tremendous 
strength of the West as residing not so much in its military and 
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economic progress than in the spiritual and institutional force of 
Christianity. This spiritual force was thought to bring the kings, the 
ruling elites and the people together to form a strong and civilized 
“society” in the West. To counter the West, the leaders of the study 
societies were determined to rebuild the spiritual and institutional 
foundation of Confucianism based on the common and analogous 
characteristics of Christianity. In order to create a society and a 
civilization, the strategy of the reformist literati was to revitalize the 
“modern,” the universalistic and associational elements in Confucianism 
by appropriating certain Christian beliefs and practices. In this vein, the 
study societies set forth the radical proposal to inaugurate the 
‘Confucian religion’ (kongjiao) as a comparable spiritual and institutional 
power vis-à-vis Christianity.  
 
At the practical level, the study societies drew on many Christian 
artifacts as the symbolic and political means to rejuvenate the Confucian 
tradition and the imperial state order. They involved the controversial 
practice of “Confucian Chronicle” (Kongzi jinian) in the study society 
journals to rival the “Jesus Chronicle” (Yesu jinian). The controversy had 
to do with the issue of whether the Confucian Chronicle subverted the 
Chinese imperial practice of Emperor Chronicle, a symbol of the 
Emperor’s absolutist power (Tang 1993). For the same reason, the 
designation of Sunday as the resting and meeting day of the study 
societies was no less embattled among the scholar officials (Wang 2002: 
446-7). 
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The appropriation of Christian practices and institutions, however, 
should not be taken as a mere formalistic gesture on the part of the 
literati. For them the various ritual practices of study societies 
constituted the modern Christian and Confucian civilizations. The core 
notions of equality and association were espoused by a plethora of study 
societies devoted to the eradication of foot-binding practice among 
women. There was also an equalization of rituals and etiquettes among 
study society members with different status and official titles (Wang 
1971: 291). Other reformed ritual practices included “Confucius 
worship” and “Yellow Emperor Chronicle” as the symbolic means of 
uniting the people, asceticism and daily discipline as the means of 
extending human life and strengthening the Chinese people, and the 
cultivation of children’s learning and the liberation of women as the 
path towards saving the national body of China.  
 
The overarching purpose of reforming these ritual practices was to 
recover ‘affect’ or ‘love-power’ (aili) as the implicit moral and 
metaphysical principle in Confucianism and Christianity and to 
reconstitute the ‘solidarity’ or ‘society’ (qun) among Chinese. While 
‘affect’ or ‘love’ was conceived as the basis of the material and spiritual 
power of Christian civilization, it was held to be universally present in 
the physical world as electronic attraction and in the social world as 
interpersonal association. In any case, ‘affect’ or ‘love’ was held to be 
essentially the same as the metaphysical entity of ‘humanity’ or ren in 
Confucianism. As Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao pointed out: 
Benevolence is ren, electricity, and ether, all of which residing in 
Civilization and Competition 
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every human individual… From this arises the ren of the human 
order, the civilization of the human order, the evolution of the 
human order, and the order of ‘Great Prosperity’ (taiping) and 
‘Grand Harmony’ (datong). (Kang 1903, quoted in Li 2003[1979]: 95) 
 
The origin of the world, the life of every creature, the continuation of 
family and state, the institution of rituals and propriety: none of 
them originates not from the entity of ren. If there were no ‘affect’ 
(aili), the world would immediately fall apart. (Liang 1901, quoted in 
Li 2003[1979]: 96) 
 
The convergence between Christianity and Confucianism can be 
discerned in the closely related category of society or qun, a word 
directly adopted from the early Confucian Xunzi (340-245 B.C.). As the 
principle of qun originates from the mutual attraction between earth and 
heaven and culminates in the human way of forming association, Liang 
held that the strength of the West lay precisely in its rich fabric of 
associational life as shown in the association of citizens in (sic) 
parliaments, of bourgeoisie in corporations, and of intellectuals in study 
societies. But Liang was quick to deny that the associational tradition 
originated in the West; rather it had long been practiced among the 
literati in Imperial China until the absolutist rule of the Qing (Liang 
2000[1896]: 374). Despite the doubts over the ‘Christianization’ of 
Confucianism by some study societies, the universalistic and 
associational orientation was widely identified as the constitutive 
principles of Confucianism per se. The associational structure of study 
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society and its analogous characteristics with modern civil society 
should thus be understood in light of its broader intents to compete with 
Christianity and thereby the West.  
 
 
Confucian Religion and Missions in Hunan Province 
While Kang Youwei first proposed the idea of Confucian religion and 
implemented it in the Strengthening Study Societies in Beijing and 
Shanghai, this idea was of great cultural significance when it was spread 
to Hunan province. As the most ‘robust’ and ‘spirited’ region during the 
reform era, Hunan had witnessed the founding of thirty-three study 
societies from 1895 to 1898, making up almost half of the total number in 
China and outshining the 17 societies in Shanghai and the 14 in Beijing. 
Among the study societies in Hunan, the Southern Study Society (nan 
xuyhui) had been the most influential, before which only seven societies 
were founded (Ding 2000: 328-9, 345 n.39). In adopting the Confucian 
religion as their guiding principle, the Southern Study Society and its 
related associations had considerably elaborated the meanings and 
functions of ‘civilization’ and ‘society’.  
 
In the first place, ‘Confucian religion’ and ‘civilization’ implicated 
the control of popular violence, a problem rampant in Hunan. The cases of 
violent attacks on foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians (jiao’an) 
were denounced by the study societies as irrational, irresponsible, and 
barbaric, threatening the state’s survival and inducing the imperialist 
Civilization and Competition 
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retaliations. While the populace was largely to blame, the anti-Christian 
violence was often led by the local elites and junior degree-holders in the 
name of defending Confucian ethics and cosmological order against 
Christianity. In this vein ‘Confucian religion’ was contrasted with the 
Confucian fundamentalism of conservative elites. In its principled 
adherence to the distinction between civilization and barbarism, genuine 
Confucianism prescribes that a civilized state like China should never 
treat the alien races with force and terror. Violence was thus denounced 
not only in its threats to the fate of state survival but also in its 
deprivation of state honor in the international realm. The barbaric 
anti-foreign and anti-Christian attacks had earned China the 
contemptuous name of ‘semi-civilized state’ (banyou jiaohua zhiguo) 
among the Western nations. While competition with the Christian West 
was important, it must be distinguished from outright conflicts and 
violence. Apart from the ethical commands of Confucian religion itself, 
China was forced to adopt the ‘universal principles’ (gongli) of 
civilization because the imperialist states upheld the differentiation 
between ‘civilized’ nations and the barbaric and semi-civilized one, 
treating the former with equality and respects while intruding the latter 
in terms of religion and government: 
The European nations presume the importance of universal 
principles, for which the barbaric states should be treated differently 
from their civilized counterparts. It would not be brutal to kill their 
peoples, and not unjust to occupy their territories. Whenever the 
peoples in the West plan to ruin a state and seize its territories, they 
will circulate pamphlets and newspapers in which the state is 
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.10 
 
14 
derided as utterly uncivilized, such that they should impose religion 
on it; and its people as severely deprived, such that they should 
govern them (Xiang Bao 1898: June 6). 
 
Hence implicit in the notions of ‘civilization’ and ‘Confucian religion’ is 
the pressure generated by the unequal competition with imperialism, 
which imposed upon China the ‘universal principles’ or the generalized 
needs of denouncing the use of violence in favor of a tighter control of 
aggressive emotions and self-restraints of affect on the part of its elites 
and people.  
 
Equally important was the idea of ‘mission’, which was proposed as 
a practical substitute for popular violence against Christianity. ‘If we are 
so hateful of the Christian missions in China, why don’t we preach 
Confucian religion on our own?’ (Xiang Bao 1898: March 29a). If the 
strength of Christianity and thereby the West rested upon the 
missionary efforts of the churches, then the weakness of Confucian 
religion and China had to do with the underdevelopment of study 
societies as the cultural and functional equivalents to their ecclesiastical 
counterparts. The lecturing activities of study societies were not merely 
taken at their cognitive values: rather they constituted quasi-religious 
rituals for proponents and opponents. The public lectures were criticized 
for their resemblance with Christian preaching in which the preacher 
proselytized among his listeners and they sit side by side with no 
differentiation of their official titles and social status, a practice deviating 
from the Confucian hierarchical system. In reply to this critique, the 
Civilization and Competition 
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quasi-Christian form of study society activities was justified for its intent 
to promote and defend Confucian religion (Xiang Bao 1898: March 12). 
The religious analogy between the ‘mission’ of study societies and 
Christian churches was taken even more seriously when they defended 
Shandong against the German occupation in an attempt to rescue 
Confucius’ tomb as the ‘Jerusalem’ of China (Xiang Bao 1898: April 18b).  
 
However, the preservation of Confucian religion in missions was 
conceived in terms of its relevance to the inter-state competition in 
strength and in honor. If the study societies were as successful as the 
Christian churches in spreading their messages all over the world, China 
should be able to shed away the disdainful labels of barbarism and 
semi-civilization (Xiang Bao Lei Zuan 1968[1898]: 438-44). This aspect 
refers to the second meaning of civilization as the competition for prestige 
and honor under the international system configured by the imperialist 
West.  
 
For the study society intellectuals in Hunan, the great dishonor of 
the Qing state in the international system, which differentiated and 
ranked the states in terms of their levels of civilization and the peoples 
in their levels of civility, had to do with the demoralizing effects of its 
civil service examination system. The civil service examination had 
distracted the scholars and the officials from the genuine concerns with 
Confucian religion. But the universal principles of civilization and 
civility originated from Confucian religion, which had been nevertheless 
repudiated after the sage kings of antique China and adopted and 
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partially practiced by Christianity. With the conflict and competition of 
contemporary China with the Western nation-states, however, 
‘civilization’ would eventually return to its origin in Confucian religion 
and fully realize its principles and values. The civilized, not merely 
military and technological, competition of China was significant for 
resisting the imperialist invasions and regaining its honor as the most 
civilized state in the world.  
 
The third meaning of civilization referred to the constitution of societal 
community and national identity. In this regard study society was to 
integrate the four traditional classes into a single nation comprising of 
‘four billion individuals’ (siwanwan zhizhong). As the civil society 
literature has rightly pointed out, here study societies retained and 
indeed promoted the dominance of local gentry elites over the common 
people, such that the democratization of power (pingquan) was largely 
confined to the relationships between the political and intellectual elites 
at the exclusion of the ‘ignorant folks’.  
 
But study society should not be understood as a mere instance of the 
institutionalization of the local gentry’s dominance, as there was a 
‘civilizational’ dimension underlying its very conception of a national 
community. The initiatives of study societies to defend the Confucian 
religion against Christianity constituted the basis for all Chinese people 
to identify with their common religion and national lineage. In a similar 
fashion to Christianity, Confucian religion prescribes the ‘natural’ 
equality and solidarity of the people as owners of one and the same 
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national-state, which is never the private property of any single 
individual (Xiang Bao 1898: March 11). ‘Society,’ ‘state’ and 
‘public-private’ thus belong to the universal principles of civilization, 
which differentiate human beings from animals precisely in the 
readiness of the former to associate freely and equally. While study 
society could be taken as a civil society in making, such an interpretation 
should be placed in a broader ‘civilizational’ perspective. 
 
But the constitution of national community was never independent 
from power. In reality, the study societies and their programme of 
Confucian religion and civilization had to confront and reconcile with 
the power and domination of the imperial state. While the study 
societies arose with the breakdown of state monopoly and amidst 
imperialist attacks, they were always caught between illegitimacy and 
legitimacy as imperial state policies oscillated between repression and 
approval (Xiang Bao 1898: April 15). Conversely the study societies 
purported to institutionalize themselves as the societal basis for the 
emerging Chinese nation-state, by performing the various de facto 
functions of governance, official training, commerce, policing welfare 
and even liturgy (Xiang Bao 1898: April 16a; April 16b; April 18a). 
 
In adhering to the universal principles of equality, freedom and 
civilization, the study societies stood in tension with the imperial state. 
In some radical accounts, the state was identified as the source of 
authoritarianism and barbarism that were responsible for the eclipse of 
egalitarian and public spirits in Confucian religion, a point later taken 
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up as the leitmotif of the study society movement in the revolutionary 
era (Xiang Bao 1898: April 16c). The uneasy position of study society 
vis-à-vis the domination of the imperial state on the one hand, and the 
legitimating principles of egalitarianism and civilization on the other, 
was manifested in the lack of consensus among its members concerning 
the proper boundaries between state and society (Xiang Bao Lei Zuan 
1968[1898]: 407-16).  
 
This brings us to the four and final aspects of civilization as the 
reconstruction of cultural tradition. We have discussed the constructed 
relationship between Confucian religion and the universal principles of 
civilization, which legitimated the adoption of equality, society and 
affect as the founding themes and practices of the study society 
movement. The convergence of Christianity and Confucianism in these 
principles, however, had been called in question in view of the incessant 
military contests among nations, which defied normative regulations per 
se (Xiang Bao Lei Zuan 1968[1898]: 445-8). Apart from its tension with 
imperialist competition, at times the efforts at cultural legitimation also 
clashed with those of imperial domination and national identification. 
For the reconciliation of Chinese and Western civilizations and thereby 
the enhancement of the competitive strengths of the Chinese state, 
adoption of Western clothing and inter-marriage with Westerners were 
proposed (Xiang Bao 1898: March 29b). This radical proposal was one of 
the easy targets of critiques and attacks by the conservative elites.  
 
The study societies in Hunan were met with strong opposition from 
Civilization and Competition 
19 
the conservative intellectuals who sought popular and elite support in 
their counter-attacks. The conservative alliance was especially strong as 
the former soldiers of the Hunan Army were dispatched to their native 
place either as sub-degree elites or as marginalized bandits. As a civilian 
army substituting for the corruptive and impotent eight-banner military 
elites of the Qing, the Hunan Army had effectively mobilized the local 
militia in the name of defending Confucianism against the Taiping 
rebels. This peculiar mode of militarization arose in response to the 
de-monopolization of military power by the Qing government and 
enhanced the remarkable traditionalism of the Hunan people in the 
second half of the nineteenth century (Kuhn 1980).  
 
Such a socio-historical configuration contributed to the rapid demise 
of the study society movement in Hunan, despite its early signs of 
robustness. While at its early stage the reform initiatives of the study 
societies in Hunan received tremendous support from some renowned 
intellectuals like Wang Xianqian, the adherence to the ‘universal’ 
principles of equality, freedom and civilization eventually resulted in 
rejection in the name of ‘defending the orthodoxy’ (yijiao). The practices 
of adopting the ‘Jesus Chronicle’ were associated with treacherous acts 
like ‘perming blonde hairs’, ‘following the Cross’, and ‘treating family 
members as animals.’ In this way, the multilayered meanings of 
‘civilization’ were being ‘deflated’ or undervalued, as the normative 
principles and symbolic functions it connoted were all reduced, under 
the influence of Confucian fundamentalism, into the shameful 
conversion to Christianity and subservience to the West. Like the 
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religious cases it purported to control, the attacks on the study society 
movement in Hunan were launched under the alliance of the elites and 
the masses. Well before the failure of the coup de’tat in 1898, some study 
society members were expulsed by the elites and the populace out of the 
Hunan province (Esherwick 1976; Platt 2007). 
 
 
Military Citizenship and Sports in Shanghai 
After the brief repression and prohibition by the Qing state at the turn of 
the twentieth century the center of gravity of the study society 
movement had moved to Shanghai and more broadly the economically 
advanced region of Jiangnan, although the number of study societies in 
other places (including Hunan) continued to grow. Among the 276 
study societies that had been established from 1901 to 1904, 77 were 
located in Jiangsu, 51 in Zhejiang, and 170 in Shanghai, altogether 
making up over sixty percents of the total (Sang 1995: 275). At the 
cultural level, the sea change was shown in a sudden shift of emphasis 
among the study societies from Confucian religion to the development 
of the military, citizenship, and sports. The study society movement in 
Shanghai was further distinguished from its Hunan predecessor in its 
relative emphasis on the pressure of international competition and hence 
the urgency of uniting the Chinese people into a national community. 
Accordingly the discourses and practices of study societies shifted away 
from their previous stress on the need to accommodate traditional 
practices and submit to political domination, though these aspects 
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remained important. 
 
While the notion of ‘civilization’ continued to connote the universal 
principles of equality and freedom, it was stamped with a heightened 
sense of urgency due to international competition, which was explicitly 
likened to a ‘swallowing’ monster. Those civilized nations adhering to 
the principles of autonomy and self-government could swallow the 
territories of others at will, whereas those barbaric nations were 
subjected to swallowing (Jingzhong Ribao 1904: June 14-18). Competition 
was not only identified as the defining characteristics of the twentieth 
century, but also elevated as a universal principle governing the 
evolution and the natural selection of nations. In any case, the essence of 
competition was to preserve one’s own rights and autonomy against the 
intrusion of others, which necessitates the unification of the people into 
a great solidarity group or ‘society’ (Su Bao 1903: April 22). The success 
of transforming China into a new nation thus depended upon the 
‘materials upon which the nation is to be built’, that is, the ‘quality’ or 
‘civility’ of the Chinese people (Su Bao 1903: June 2). 
 
In this vein the study society movement in Shanghai shared with its 
Hunan predecessor the emphasis on the distinction between competition 
and open conflict and the denunciation of irrational and uncontrolled 
violence. The critique was targeted at the Boxer Rebellion, which had 
incurred heavy indemnities and disgrace among the Chinese. The blind 
efforts of ‘aiding the Qing’ and ‘eliminating the foreigners’ (fuqing 
mieyang) were far from genuine nationalism (read: not Confucian 
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religion), which necessitates the competence on the part of the citizens to 
articulate and follow the proper ways of preserving national territory 
and expulsing foreigners. The Boxer Rebellion was nothing but an 
outbreak of intense hatred against the encroachment of foreign 
embassies and churches into their daily lives. Their impulsiveness, 
stupidity and stubbornness were comparable to inferior horses and dogs, 
who merely respond to immediate stimuli but never constitute a 
solidarity group or society that could compete with their enemies in a 
conscious and disciplined way (Su Bao 1903: May 8-9). The study society 
was thus responsible for cultivating among the Chinese the generalized 
capacity to control affect and to refrain from violence that would only 
accentuate imperialist attacks and national crisis. Hence what 
distinguishes civilization from barbarism, or ‘society’ from ‘animal,’ was 
not just the repression of aggressive impulses; it also entailed the 
affective commitment of individuals to the fate and honor of the Chinese 
nation (Su Bao 1903: April 8).  
 
The outrageous behaviors of the Boxers and the distorted 
characteristics of the Chinese were in turn attributed to the ‘slavery 
education’ (nuli jiaoyu) under the authoritarian rule of the alien Manchu 
regime, which had cultivated a pathos of individualism among the 
Chinese (Su Bao 1903: May 8-9). The notion of ‘slavery education’ 
originated from the widespread resistance of the students to both 
government-run and church-run academies, both of which relying 
heavily upon the financial supports and coordination efforts of the 
gentry merchants. But while the gentry merchants delighted in 
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championing themselves as the supporters and guardians of 
‘civilization,’ more often than not they undertook these tasks solely out 
of the possible gains to be derived from in serving the imperialist 
powers, and/or their submissiveness to the New Policy initiatives of the 
authoritarian government. Conflicts thus arose within the academies 
between the conservative, ‘barbaric’ gentry merchants and the radical, 
‘civilized’ students, which gave rise to the formation of most study 
societies in Shanghai, including the most influential ones, the 
Educational Society of China (Zhongguo jiaoyuhui) and the Patriotic 
Study Society (Aiguo xueshe). In the process, however, the students 
themselves further contributed to the ‘inflation’ of the meaning of 
‘civilization’ by elevating even the pettiest conflicts into the 
uncompromising battles between civilization and barbarism. 
 
The general dissatisfaction with the Qing state and the gentry 
merchants grew along with the renunciation of the Christian Church as 
the agent and model of civilization. Apart from the distrust of religion as 
a superstitious force motivating the Boxers, and of Confucianism as the 
ideological foundation of the Manchu state, the attitude change towards 
the churches was directed against their alliance with the authoritarian 
state and the gentry merchants. While the imperialist powers were 
regarded as a civilizing force in their protection of activist intellectuals 
and students from state prosecutions by resorting to the extraterritorial 
rights, their general interest in maintaining the status quo coincided 
with those of the gentry merchants (and not infrequently those 
apparently radical students who were actually status-seeking and hence 
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likewise ‘barbaric’). Under the commercialized setting of the concessions, 
the coalition set the limits of radical action, imputing the 1911 revolution 
in Shanghai with a reactionary, non-violent character more reminiscent 
of an elite-based coup de’tat than a far-reaching social revolution. 
 
But then what constituted the alternative to ‘Confucian religion’ as 
the principle and practice of ‘civilization’ in the study society movement 
in Shanghai? Here the ‘secular’ alternative of military citizenship 
(junguomin zhuyi) was proposed and widely adopted. While the notion 
was undoubtedly a response to the growing salience of international 
war at the turn of the twentieth century, it shared the same emphasis 
with Confucian religion in its denunciation of unprincipled violence and 
the cultivation of affective identification with the nascent Chinese nation. 
More importantly, militarism was elevated and generalized into a 
theoretical and practical model of civilization that was indispensable for 
the cultivation of state strength under international competition.  
 
Central to the notion of military citizenship was a normative model 
of the army, which was conceived as at once the most barbaric and the 
most civilized. It was the most barbaric because all nations were forced 
to maintain their armies in order to survive military contests. The 
defeated nations would be robbed of freedom and equality once and for 
all, and suffer destruction and enforced compensations. It was power 
and killing rather than the universal principles of civilization that 
governed the age of “survival of the fittest”. On the other hand, the 
army was the most civilized because the military, devoted itself to the 
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cultivation of a military spirit, army and fraternal solidarity among their 
soldiers as well as their peoples. In particular, army etiquettes and rituals 
(junli) signified the norms of mutuality and respect, not only between 
superiors and inferiors but also between enemies, honoring the 
nationalistic sentiments and devotions of their soldiers and peoples (Su 
Bao 1903: March 3).  
 
The army was glorified as the ‘Mother of Civilization.’ As the 
foundation of national defense and expansion, military forces were 
critical for the spread of commerce, religion, colonialism, and indeed all 
artifacts of civilization and progress. The level of civilization was thus 
directly correlated with the degree of military strength. Those nations 
without sufficient military strength to secure their own survival were at 
the same time deprived of the intellectual and technological progress of 
civilization. A great nation with the highest attainment of civilization 
was possible only with the bloods, tears and nationalist devotion of her 
army. Competition thus entails the strategic use of the strongest possible 
means for securing national survival and accomplishing civilization. 
Only if a nation adhered to civilization as her ‘mind’ or principle but 
barbarism as her ‘body’ or strategy could her people survive the military 
contests and enjoy the fruits of civilization (Su Bao 1903: March 3).  
 
The notion of military citizenship stood in tension with 
Confucianism, in particular its emphasis on filial piety. A story was told 
about a Japanese solider refusing to retreat from the war with the 
Russians even though his father was seriously ill. The narrow-minded, 
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.10 
 
26 
vulgar disciples of Confucius would readily blame the Japanese solider 
as un-filial because Confucianism put the affective relationship between 
father and son as deeply rooted in the natural disposition of human 
beings. But the father-son relationship was one of the “private 
gratitudes” (sien) rather than the basis of “‘public justice” (gongyi). The 
affective commitment of individuals to their respective families should 
never hinder their shared identification with society and nation-state. 
While recognizing the Confucian principle of filial piety, military 
citizenship emphasized the allocation and generalization of affect from 
the private to the public realm (Jingzhong Ribao 1904: June 2).  
 
At the practical level, military citizenship was distinguished from 
the strategic deployment of armed force and the mobilization of the 
masses. Military citizenship singled out sports as a peaceful and 
disciplined way of cultivating civility among ordinary Chinese 
(Brownell 1995, Morris 2004) Among the 276 study societies that had 
been established from 1901 to 1904, seventeen were sports clubs. But 
sports activities were also widely practiced among educational societies 
(21 in number), speech societies (25), and those societies devoted to the 
promotion of health and social custom reforms (8) (Sang 1995: 275).  
 
In much the same way as the modern West, the ancient Chinese 
were thought to have paid considerable attention to sports and their 
military spirits and the military strength of the imperial state had been 
strong. The Book of Rites were quoted as legitimatizing sports activities. 
With the passage of time, however, the Chinese disparaged sports and 
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in this way weakened their military spirits and state strength. But the 
contemporary efforts of ‘preserving the race’ and ‘defending the nation’ 
(baozhong baoguo) could be nothing but empty talks if the elites and the 
common people were not cultivated with the bodily strength and 
courage necessary for military and political contests (Su Bao 1903: March 
16).  
 
The current weakness and vulnerability of the Chinese nation and its 
citizenry could be transformed only by practicing army gymnastics, 
which prepared its citizens for war and more importantly cultivated in 
them a collective and strong sentiment against the enemies. Military 
exercises and physical education were important because health was the 
prerequisite of all kinds of mental activities and competence on the part 
of the citizens. Sports also constituted the physical basis of moral action, 
as health was indispensable for supporting one’s families, friends and 
nation in situations of emergency and crisis. Finally, sports and health 
were critical to the progress and evolution of humankind. The primitives 
were marked by their sluggishness and indifference to pains and 
pleasures, just as the Chinese were largely insensitive to the pains of 
their society as inflicted by the imperialist West. Sports were thus critical 
in sensitizing their affective feeling and identification with the nation, 
and in this way to reawaken their sense of historic mission to realize the 
telos of human history that is civilization (Su Bao 1903: March 16).  
 
In contrast to popular violence, therefore, military citizenship and 
sports were intended for the control (positive and negative) of affect and 
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the cultivation of civility among the Chinese, a purpose deemed more 
important than its practical, proto-military functions. But with the 
limited efficacy of study societies under the alliance of the gentry 
merchants with imperial/imperialist domination, the importance 
assigned to militarism and sports was eventually repudiated in favor of 
the direct violence of secret societies, which were accordingly identified 
as the spearheads of revolution and civilization. While bandits and 
outcasts exhibited ‘barbaric’ traits, they were said to possess civilities 
like courage and solidarity in their peculiar ways. It signified the 
gradual approval of violence among the Chinese intellectuals as a 
legitimate method of importing civilization and enhancing state strength 
via revolution. 
 
 
Comparison between Meiji Japan and Late Qing China:  
The Problem of the State’s Monopolization of Power 
As with early modern Europe, the notion of ‘civilization’ had occupied a 
prominent place in the state-building process in late Qing China. It is 
important to note the study society movement in China had its 
precedent in Meiji Japan, where study societies (gakukai) were designed 
to promote “civilization and enlightenment” (bunmei kakai) among the 
samurai and people. But while in early modern Europe the ideas and 
practices of ‘civilization’ were originated from the power centers of the 
absolutist courts, those articulated by the Japanese study societies were 
eventually adopted and elicited by the centralizing Meiji state as the 
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ideological foundation of its militarism and imperialism. By comparision, 
the study societies in late Qing China were distinctive in its efforts to 
cultivate a culture of civility without presupposing the monopolization of 
military and political powers by the state.  
 
As a rule, ‘civilization’ and the closely related notion of ‘society’ both 
presuppose and underlie the state’s monopolization of power. The 
absolutist and later imperialist state formation in Western Europe and 
Tokugawa Japan are two notable examples in which the cultures of 
‘civilization’ firstly flourished among the ruling elites and eventually 
spread to the common people. In both cases ‘civilization’ entailed the 
‘taming’ or social and political control of the elites by the absolutist 
rulers and later of the citizens by the rationalized state bureaucracies. On 
the other hand, the colonial state power in India was legitimated and 
institutionalized as part of the imperialist project of Britain to civilize the 
indigenous, ‘barbaric’ peoples all over the world.  
  
Where the monopolization of state power was partial and ineffective 
as in nineteenth-century Germany, ‘culture’ and ‘community’ 
substituted ‘civilization’ and ‘society’ to be the catchwords in the 
Chinese nationalist project of state formation. While the state-building in 
China was likewise nationalist in character, the inward-looking, 
exclusivist and fascist connotations of ‘culture’ and ‘community’ never 
took hold under the condition of de-monopolization of state power. It 
was reflected in the manifold differences of Guomindang China, Nazi 
Germany, and Fascist Italy, despite the adoption of fascist trappings like 
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the Blue Shirts in Jiang Jieshi’s New Life Movement. By contrast, 
‘civilization’ and ‘society’ were embraced with enthusiasm among the 
late Qing and early Republican intellectuals, even though they were 
fully aware of their imperialist implications. Finally, when ‘civilization’ 
is eventually adopted by Communist China, it represents a renewed 
effort by the state to reshape the urban neighborhoods of pre-Olympic 
Beijing and its exercise of disciplinary power over the rural areas. In any 
case it presupposes the absolute sovereignty and biopower of the state 
over its territories and subjects.  
 
Puzzles thus arise concerning the conditions, processes and 
consequences of study societies as part of a civilizing movement that 
emerged under the gradual disintegration of the state. An easy answer 
can be found in the diffusion of ideas and practices of ‘civilization’ from 
the imperialist West via Meiji Japan. While undoubtedly the late Qing 
notions of civilization and society were heavily influenced by, if not 
directly adopted from, its Meiji counterparts, they were further 
articulated and elaborated in accordance with the peculiar context of late 
Qing China, in particular the pressing problems of modern nation-state 
formation. The elaboration of these ideas in terms of ‘Confucian religion’ 
and ‘military citizenship’ had neither precedents nor equivalents even in 
Meiji Japan. Be that as it may, the focus of this paper is not so much on 
the origins of ideas and ideologies than on their practical meanings and 
functions in the study society initiatives and their efforts to civilize the 
Chinese.  
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This paper does not attempt a full-fledged comparison between the 
study societies in Meiji Japan and late Qing China. However, the 
comparative aspects of study societies are nevertheless crucial for our 
analysis of the Chinese case. For the study societies in both Japan and 
China, ‘civilization’ referred above all to such things as freedom, 
equality and independence that were seen to be exemplified by the 
‘civilized’ citizens and the strong Western nation states. At the practical 
level, the ‘civility’ in question entailed the control of affect or emotion 
that was held to be indispensable for the emerging nation-states to 
triumph and survive their competition with the imperialist powers. 
Positively the control referred to the commitments of individual and 
collective sentiments towards the nations, whereas negatively it 
consisted of the repression of any impulsive and violent acts that would 
jeopardize their competition with the West.  
 
While internal pacification was largely achieved in Japan during the 
late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, the study society movement was 
eventually co-opted and incorporated by the centralizing Meiji state 
after a succession of spectacular military successes, in particular its 
victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. The notion of 
‘civilization’ was adopted and transformed into the ideological 
foundation of Japan militarism. The former emphasis on freedom, 
equality and civilization was repudiated, though not unanimously, by 
the samurai intellectuals, who chose either to join the government or to 
rebuild the abortive ‘freedom and civil right’ movement.   
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The year 1894 was also the turning point for late Qing China. After 
successive military defeats, the late Qing witnessed the rise of popular 
objections against the state’s extractions of military expenditures and the 
payment of indemnities. It also experienced ever-escalating religious 
cases, in which popular (and elite) violence was directed against the 
foreigners, the Christians, and at times the local officials protecting them. 
While the enhancement of civility and thereby societal and state strength 
was a predominant theme shared by the study societies in China and 
Japan, the experiences of political and cultural conflicts placed a strong 
stamp on the meanings and practices of ‘civilization’ in the case of late 
Qing China.  
 
Specifically, the study societies were largely oriented to the control 
of fanatical, and hence ‘barbaric’, use of violence against imperialism on 
the one hand, and the sublimation of egoistic, and hence equally 
‘barbaric’, traits of the people into an affective identification with the 
Chinese nation and its fate on the other hand. With the breakdown of 
state power, however, the study society movement encountered 
tremendous resistance from an alliance of social and political powers at 
the local level, such that its civilizing offensives remained limited in 
scope and impact. While the themes of freedom and equality were 
retained, they were eventually incorporated into the revolutionary 
movement. In particular the Communist Party originated from study 
societies like the ‘New Citizenry Study Society’ (xinmin xuehui) and the 
‘Enlightenment Society’ (juewushe), of which Chairman Mao Zedong and 
Primer Zhou Enlai were once active members (Dirlik 1989; Van de Ven 
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1991). But in the process the notions of ‘civilization’ and ‘society’ 
eventually gave way to ‘socialism’ and ‘class’ as the legitimating devices 
of revolutionary violence.   
 
 
Conclusion 
The frequent military defeats led to the ‘demonopolization’ of the 
imperial power and a crisis of legitimacy. These in turn provoked a 
series of anti-Christian conflicts and the Boxer Rebellion, and 
contributed to the growth of Confucian fundamentalism among the 
militarized and conservative elites and to the rise of national identity 
among the Chinese. The military defeats created new cultural and 
political spaces for the study societies to intervene in local and national 
arenas and to address the political crises by devising the symbolic and 
practical means of ‘civilization.’ From this follows the salience of 
‘civilization’ in Hunan, where the rise of local autonomy and 
self-government enhanced traditionalism and anti-foreignism. On the 
other hand, the currency of ‘civilization’ in Shanghai owed to the 
extraterritorial rights of the imperialist concessions, thereby creating a 
relatively pacified environment and constraining the rise of radical 
politics.  
 
Throughout the late Qing, the notions of “civilization,” “society,” 
and “civility” were articulated, practiced and institutionalized in the 
study societies as emergent and compromised responses to the 
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challenges of strong imperialist powers, the decline of the imperial state, 
the legitimation of the emerging nation-state, and the rise of a nascent 
Chinese nation. Closely related to these functional demands are four 
interrelated symbolic meanings of civility: conferral of status honor 
(competition), control of popular violence (domination), construction of 
cultural tradition (legitimation), and constitution of societal solidarity 
(identification). During the reform era, the notion of ‘Confucian religion’ 
and the ritual practices of ‘mission’ had been advanced in response to 
the relative importance of imperial domination and ideological 
legitimation. The legitimacy of the study society movement had to be 
sought in the reconstruction of Confucian ideology and the recruitment 
of official membership and patronage. On the other hand, ‘military 
citizenship’ and ‘sports’ were articulated and practiced during the 
revolutionary era to cope with the increasingly pressing problems of 
international competition and national identification. The transition was 
precipitated by the Boxer Rebellion, which seriously weakened the 
power and legitimacy of the imperial state and devalued the utility of 
religion as a possible basis of national identification. The emphasis on 
the military reflected the progressive weakening of state power and this 
provided the room for the study societies to directly engage in quasi- 
and even proto-military actions against imperialism. 
 
 The demonopolization of state power contributed to new patterns of 
class coalition and the state’s eventual failure to build the modern 
Chinese nation-state by ‘civilized’, non-violent means. Specifically, it led 
to the alliance of militarized and traditionalistic gentry with the masses 
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against the imperialists in the economically backward region of Hunan. 
This led to the ‘deflation’ or undervaluation of the meanings of 
‘civilization’ and consequently the rise of revolutionary violence with a 
fanatic, mob character. By comparison, the alliance of commercialized 
and apparently progressive gentry with the imperialist and imperial 
powers against the masses and the radical intellectuals in Shanghai 
brought about the ‘inflation’ or overvaluation of ‘civilization’ and the 
rise of revolutionary violence of an opportunistic, elitist character. 
 
Methodologically, this article confronts the problem of causal 
generalization where there are too many variables and too few cases. 
The uniqueness of historical cases, especially the development of study 
societies in China and Japan, defies explanation involving nomological 
laws and statistical regularities. But it does not preclude attempts at 
sociological explanation. By exploring the form of social mechanism, it is 
possible to examine the complexity of social forces and processes 
operating in various circumstances. By specifying the initial conditions 
of the study society movement in China and Japan, one is possible to 
highlight the general mechanisms of war-making, competition and state 
formation essential for producing the distinctive patterns of the 
civilizing process in these countries. In the final analysis, historical 
particularity and theoretical generality can be reconciled in the study of 
a single case and can test the existing theories of state formation and 
civilization. 
 
 
Social and Cultural Research Occasional Paper No.10 
36 
Glossary of Chinese and Japanese Terms 
Aiguo xueshe      愛國學社 
Aili       愛力 
Banyou jiaohua zhiguo   半有教化之國 
Baozhong baoguo     保種保國 
Bunmei kakai     文明開化 
Datong       大同 
Fuqing mieyang     扶清滅洋 
Gakukai      學會 
Gongyi       公義 
Gongli       公理 
Huangdi       黃帝 
Jiao’an       教案 
Jingzhong Ribao     警鐘日報 
Juewushe      覺悟社 
Junguomin zhuyi    軍國民主義 
Junli       軍禮 
Kongjiao       孔教 
Kongzi jinian     孔子紀年 
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Nan xuyhui      南學會 
Nuti jiaoyu      奴隸教育 
Pingquan      平權 
Qun       群  
Ren        仁 
Shehui       社會 
Sien        私恩 
Siwanwan zhizhong   四萬萬之眾 
Subao       蘇報 
Taiping      太平 
Wenmin      文明 
Wuxu       戊戌 
Xiangbao       湘報  
Xinmin xuehui     新民學會 
Xuehui       學會 
Xunzi        荀子 
Yesu jinian      耶穌紀年 
Yijiao        翼教 
Zhongguo jiaoyuhui    中國教育會 
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